Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky, physicist and retired director of the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center, warns the United States must do much more to prevent the possiiblity of nuclear-grade material falling into the hands of terorrists who wish to detonate a nuclear device in an American city. Writing in the Sunday San Francisco Chronicle, Panofsky says:

It is estimated that if a nuclear device were detonated in a populous American city, it would kill hundreds of thousands of people, and the economic impact would approach $1 trillion...Experts' estimates of the imminence of such a horrific event are spread between a few years to many decades, But President Bush has acknowledged eloquently the extremity of the danger when modern technology and terrorism are combined.

...In the words of Graham Allison of Harvard University, nuclear terrorism is "a preventable threat.".....a series of barriers can be erected that, in combination, would drastically reduce the likelihood of a nuclear catastrophe. All nuclear explosives depend on the availability of either highly enriched uranium or plutonium. Manufacture of such materials is a large industrial enterprise well beyond the capability of terrorist groups.

So, for nuclear terrorism to become a reality, either a nuclear weapon would have to be stolen from national arsenals or nuclear weapons-usable materials would have to be diverted and fabricated into a deliverable bomb. The latter is a job of moderate difficulty, and the methods to produce a weapon sufficient to cause havoc are well known.

Weapons-usable materials have been produced in large quantities by the nuclear weapons states, in particular the United States and Russia, and today, these states combined still possess arsenals of about 30,000 nuclear weapons.
Highly enriched uranium and plutonium exist in quantities worldwide to make easily more than 100,000 nuclear weapons. These numbers are excessive to any national security need, and they feed the clear and present danger of nuclear terrorism.

What to do? Panofsky again.

Feasible multiple barriers to prevent a nuclear catastrophe include the following: major reductions of the enormous stockpiles of nuclear weapons and weapons-usable material; greatly improved guarding and security of these stockpiles against theft; improved and widespread use of methods of detecting weapons materials, followed by interception of the introduction of these materials, whether by shipping containers, trucks, cars or airplanes crossing national boundaries, or as far as that goes, by mules crossing the Rio Grande; improved intelligence collection covering the relevant moves of weapons-usable material.

Each of these steps is being implemented but in a manner hardly commensurate with the threat....The nuclear weapons stockpiles of Russia and the United States remain huge. Only about a quarter of Russian nuclear weapons-usable materials are protected sufficiently to meet the standards set by the U.S.-Russian agreement.

Nuclear detection devices are being introduced at a few overseas shipping points on a demonstration basis, but the effort is far from comprehensive. Pilot installations exist at ports of entry into the United States, but U.S. borders beyond the ports remain porous to the introduction of nuclear weapons or material. Nuclear terrorism exceeds any catastrophe that the United States has experienced. Yet the priority and thoroughness dedicated to avoid this "preventable catastrophe" remain inadequate. Must we wait for such a disaster before revising our priorities?

Seems to me that U.S. Congresspersons, U.S. Senators, constituents and media in major U.S. cities ought to be ratcheting up the pressure on the current administration to find the funding to begin doing better what needs to be done. For starters, Panofsky believes, that means doling out the military budget more sensibly - less on ballistic missile defense, and more on urban nuclear terrorism prevention.

The Washington, D.C.-based Arms Control Association is concerned as well, about "Preventing A Nuclear Katrina."

At a United Nations gathering last month, dozens of nations signed a Russian-initiated international convention which seeks to better define nuclear what constitutes materials trafficking. It also encourages nations to better guard nuclear stockpiles, and to pass appropriate laws strengthening nuclear security. The convention codifies the acceptability of peaceful uses of nuclear materials. While enriched urnanium is basically for bombs, plutonium has both weapons-related uses and legitimate uses, for example, producing nuclear power. Yet danger lurks especially within rogue regimes. Forbes points out that Russia is the chief private contractor for Iran's "peaceful" nuclear development program, and hints broadly at U.S. distrust of the mad mullahs. A well-placed mistrust, at that.

TECHNORATI TAGS: NUCLEAR TERRORISM, ENRICHED URANIUM, PLUTONIUM

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Posted by Matt Rosenberg at October 5, 2005 11:36 AM