Yes, last night's show was a good one. I was hoping they would give the whole hour to Michael Gilbert, but as a Stryker follower I'm biased.

Thanks for the link to our site. Just a quick correction - the Stryker Brigade is technically the 3rd Brigade of the 2nd Infantry Division and is not part of the 101st. It took over for the 101st in Mosul, however.

Thanks Todd, I fixed that. Good to hear from you. Stay in touch, and I'll be checking your site.

The public debate over Iraq seems to be permanently dominated by our reasons for entering the war; good analyses of our options for conducting it are relatively infrequent.

For some months now, the strategy of our enemies has been clear: to increase the level of violence against Americans and our allies, as well as against the basic elements of civil order in Iraq, producing one of two consequences. Either (1) Americans sicken of the costs and withdraw, as we did in Vietnam, Lebanon, and Mogadishu; or (2) Iraqis become so infuriated at our failure to provide security that they demand our withdrawal.

Unfortunately, both elements of this strategy seem to be working. Most of the media, all of the universities, and a preponderance of the Democratic party apparently agree with Ted Kennedy that Iraq is a "quagmire" from which we should withdraw immediately. Of course, it is too soon to predict that this view will ultimately prevail, but it is not too soon to observe that this tendency will seriously erode our capacity to wage war.

And one does not need to read opinion polls to see that Iraqi public opinion is also moving against us. The publicly stated reason for our "restraint" in Fallujah is the fear that it might provoke an explosion of anger against us. What an interesting concept. If Iraqi opinion is capable of exploding against anyone, why doesn't it explode against those who perpetrate the violence? Evidently, because they hate us even more than they hate our enemies.

What is to be done? I see very little sober analysis in the media about our options at this point. James Na's recent op-ed in the Seattle Times is exceptional in its candor and persuasiveness. He suggests raising the violence of our response to the point where Iraqis fear us more than they fear our enemies. Whatever one thinks of this choice--and I tend to agree with it--the Administration seems reluctant to adopt it.

Daniel Pipes has suggested that we abandon the goal of promoting representative government in Iraq, and support a pro-Western Iraqi strongman instead. This may be more realistic, but would, to say the least, represent a significant diminution of our ambitions in the Middle East, and also runs the risk of installing another version of Saddam.

Finally, there is the possibility of buying off portions of the enemy in the hope that a "divide-and-stagnate" policy will buy enough time for an acceptable government to establish its legitimacy. This seems to be our strategy in Afghanistan, and now, apparently, in Iraq. It is not self-evidently doomed to failure, but not exactly very inspiring either. Is this not also an expression of weakness?

I do not think we have yet had even a remotely satisfying debate over the options facing us. "Pull-'em-out now" is merely a form of surrender, and "bring in the U.N." just pie-in-the-sky.

When I was in the "green room" for KCTS Connects, I spoke with Michael Gilbert about the 3rd Brigade, 2nd ID (Stryker Brigade). Previously, I was very skeptical of this underarmored, thin-tired battle taxi.

Surprisingly, Gilbert told me that the vehicle has earned the respect of the crews for its toughness. The wheel system has turned out to be rather robust, particularly in the paved urban environment.

He had an excellent point about the Stryker vehicle however, which was that it is a TRANSPORT, not a high-intensity COMBAT vehicle (that's what M1 Abrams and M2/M3 Bradleys are for). What it does have, however, is the capacity to carry full squads (Bradleys can't). Again, in an urban environment, that translates into more boots to patrol and secure the ground.

I am still waiting for the US Army to field a real light armored fighting vehicle that is resistant to RPGs and heavy machine guns while providing for tough, obstacle and fire resistant wheels. But contrary to my earlier estimation, it appears that the Stryker is filling the gap nicely until then.

As for military "transformation," I urge Rosenblog readers to check out Martin van Creveld's "Transformation of War" (to which I briefly alluded in my Seattle Times piece). Van Creveld, of Hebrew University in Israel, is THE prophet of transformation, and makes a fascinating explanation of it in that book. His comments in the extensive bibliography section is priceless (and often very penetrating and even funny at times).

On the book "1984," he remarks "an end to terrorism, but at what cost?" or something to that effect.